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Abstract
The US Data Encryption Standard, DES for short,
is put forward as an interesting benchmark problem
for nonmonotonic reasoning systems because (i) it pro-
vides a set of test cases of industrial relevance which
shares features of randomly generated problems and
real-world problems, (ii) the representation of DES us-
ing normal logic programs with the stable model se-
mantics is simple and easy to understand, and (iii)
this subclass of logic programs can be seen as an in-
teresting special case for many other formalizations of
nonmonotonic reasoning. In this paper we present two
encodings of DES as logic programs: a direct one out
of the standard specifications and an optimized one ex-
tending the work of Massacci and Marraro. The com-
putational properties of the encodings are studied by
using them for DES key search with the Smodels sys-
tem as the implementation of the stable model seman-
tics. Results indicate that the encodings and Smodels
are quite competitive: they outperform state-of-the-art
SAT-checkers working with an optimized encoding of
DES into SAT and are comparable with a SAT-checker
that is customized and tuned for the optimized SAT
encoding.
Introduction
Efforts on developing implementations of nonmono-
tonic reasoning systems have intensified during the last
years and, in particular, implementation techniques
for declarative semantics of logic programs (e.g., sta-
ble model and well-founded semantics) have consid-
erably advanced. With an increasing number of sys-
tems the question of suitable test suites arises. Typ-
ical benchmarks used for testing and comparing such
systems include problems from graph theory, planning,
and constraint satisfaction (Cholewin´ski et al. 1995;
Dimopoulos, Nebel, & Koehler 1997; Niemela¨ 1999).
However, it is still difficult to find benchmark suites of
wide industrial relevance.
In this paper we advocate that logical cryptanaly-
sis is a good benchmark for nonmonotonic reasoning
systems. Logical cryptanalysis has been introduced by
∗The work of the first and third author has been funded
by the Academy of Finland (Project 43963).
Massacci and Marraro (2000) as a framework for rea-
soning about cryptographic algorithms. They pointed
out that encoding cryptographic problems as SAT prob-
lems might be beneficial for the automated reasoning
community as it provides a set of problems of indus-
trial relevance which optimally shares features of ran-
domly generated problems and real-world problems. In-
deed, the encoding of the US Data Encryption Standard
(DES) into SAT proposed in (Massacci &Marraro 2000;
Massacci 1999) has a number of useful features:
• it allows to generate random instances of similar
structure in practically inexhaustible number;
• it provides solved instances (for which one solution is
known beforehand) which are very hard, for which we
can change the value of the solution, and such that
we can generate as many different (hard) instances
as we want with the same solution;
• it has a lot of structure, and the structure is very
common to many similar problems in hardware ver-
ification, planning and constraint programming (all-
diff constraints, defined variables, layered definitions
etc.).
These considerations apply to the encoding of crypto-
graphic problems for nonmonotonic reasoning systems
with some further advantages:
• the representation of cryptographic algorithms using
normal logic programs with the stable model seman-
tics is extremely simple and easy to understand;
• normal logic programs with the stable model seman-
tics can be seen as an interesting special case for many
other more general formalizations of nonmonotonic
reasoning.
Indeed, we can provide a natural encoding of DES
out of the standard specifications (FIPS 1997; Schneier
1994; Stinson 1998) as a logic program. Massacci and
Marraro (Massacci & Marraro 2000) have developed
a SAT-encoding of DES where substantial amount of
preprocessing and optimizations are employed. As an
alternative encoding of DES using logic programs we
have upgraded Massacci and Marraro’s optimized SAT-
encoder to deal directly with logic programs. Using
these encodings one can perform most1 of the reason-
ing tasks suggested in (Massacci & Marraro 2000).
We examine the efficiency of the encodings by using
an implementation of the stable model semantics, the
Smodels system (Niemela¨ & Simons 1997; Simons 1998),
for DES key search and by comparing the performance
to that of SAT-solvers which use the optimized encoding
of DES into SAT developed Massacci and Marraro.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
start by briefly introducing the stable model semantics
and by discussing how to encode boolean expressions
as logic programs. We first describe the direct encod-
ing of DES to logic programs and then the optimized
encoding. We finish with some experimental results.
Logic Programs and Stable Models
The stable model semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988)
generalizes the minimal model semantics of definite pro-
grams to normal logic program rules
A← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn (1)
where negative body literals (not Ci) are allowed. For
a ground (variable-free) program P , the stable models
are defined as follows. The reduct PS of a program P
with respect to a set of atoms S is the program obtained
from P by deleting
1. each rule that has a negative literal not C in its body
with C ∈ S and
2. all negative literals in the remaining rules.
The reduct PS can be seen as the set of potentially
applicable rules given the stable model S, i.e., as the
rules where the negative body literals are satisfied by
the model. Note that in the reduct the negative body
literals of the potentially applicable rules are removed
and, hence, the rules are definite. The idea is that a sta-
ble model should be grounded (or justified) in the sense
that every atom in the model is a consequence of the po-
tentially applicable rules and every consequence of the
potentially applicable rules is included in the model.
The atomic consequences of a set of definite rules can
be captured by the unique minimal model, the least
model, of the set seen as definite clauses. Hence, a set
of atoms is a stable model of a program if it coincides
with the least model of the reduct.
Definition 1 Let P be a ground program. Then a set
of ground atoms S is a stable model of P iff S is the
least model of PS.
Example 2 Program P
P : p← not q, r
q ← not p
r ← not s
s← not p
1To be precise the verification of cryptographic proper-
ties proposed in (Massacci & Marraro 2000) are expressed
as quantified boolean formulae. These are out of our scope.
has a stable model S = {r, p} because S is the least
model of PS.
PS : p← r
r ←
In addition to this model, P has another stable model
{s, q} which can be verified similarly by constructing the
reduct and its least model.
The stable model semantics for programs with vari-
ables is obtained from the semantics of ground pro-
grams by employing the notion of Herbrand models.
The stable models of a program with variables are the
stable models of the ground instantiation of the pro-
gram where variables are substituted by terms from the
Herbrand universe of the program (the ground terms
built from constants and functions in the program).
Integrity constraints, i.e., rules of the form
← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn (2)
are often useful for saying that a stable model contain-
ing B1, . . . , Bm but none of C1, . . . , Cn is not accept-
able. These rules can be encoded using ordinary rules2.
Example 3 Consider program P in Example 2 ex-
tended by two integrity constraints
← not p, s
← r, not q, s
This program has only one stable model {r, p} as the
other stable model of P , {s, q}, does not satisfy the first
integrity constraint above.
Integrity constraints are a powerful and simple tech-
nique for pruning unwanted stable models as they can-
not introduce new stable models but only can eliminate
them. This means that for a program P and a set of in-
tegrity constraints IC, if S is a stable model of P ∪ IC,
then S is a stable model of P .
From Boolean Logic to Logic Programs
DES can be seen as a boolean function which takes as
input a vector of bits consisting of the plaintext and key
and outputting a vector of bits (the ciphertext). DES
is specified using standard boolean operators (negation,
disjunction, conjunction, XOR) as well as boolean func-
tions given as truth tables.
In this section we discuss how to encode such boolean
expressions using logic programs. Here the goal is to
achieve a compact and potentially computationally ef-
ficient coding. We aim to exploit the special property
of the stable model semantics that everything is false
unless otherwise stated. This means that it is enough
to consider only the conditions under which an expres-
sion is true and let the default negation to handle the
other case when the expression is false.
2For example, by introducing two new atoms f and f ′
and a new rule f ′ ← not f ′, f and finally replacing every
rule of the form (2) with one having f as its head.
Table 1: Mapping boolean expression to rules
Subexpression Rules
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln p← pl1 , . . . , pln
l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln p← pl1
...
p← pln
¬l p← not pl
l1 ⊕ l2 p← pl1 , not pl2
p← not pl1 , pl2
Given a boolean expression ϕ we provide a logic pro-
gram Pϕ such that satisfying truth assignments of ϕ and
stable models of Pϕ coincide. This can be done by in-
troducing a new atom pψ for each subexpression ψ of ϕ
and, according the intuition mentioned above, by only
giving rules stating all conditions on its subexpressions
under which ψ is true.
In Table 1 we give the corresponding rules for dif-
ferent kinds of subexpressions. We use the convention
that we denote by p the corresponding new atom of
the subexpression in question and by pl the new atom
introduced for any further subexpression l.
As a further optimization, note that it is not nec-
essary to introduce a new atom in the program for
negated subexpressions ’¬l’ as they can be represented
as ’not pl’ in the program, a positive literal can be rep-
resented as such, and an expression ’not not a’ as ’a’.
For the rest of the original propositional atoms, which
are not introduced as abbreviations in the original
boolean expression, the assumption about the default
negation is false because they can have any of the two
truth values. Therefore we encode this by introducing
a new atom aˆ for each atomic subexpression a and in-
cluding two rules
a← not aˆ (3)
aˆ← not a
stating that either a is in the stable model or aˆ is in the
model (when a is not there).
Now the satisfying truth assignments of ϕ and the
stable models Pϕ correspond in the following sense:
1. Each stable model S of Pϕ induces a truth assign-
ment T where an atom a is true in T iff a ∈ S and
for each subexpression ψ of ϕ, ψ is true in T iff the
corresponding new atom pψ is in S.
2. Each truth assignment T induces a stable model S of
Pϕ such that for each subexpression ψ of ϕ, ψ is true
in T iff the corresponding new atom pψ is in S.
In order to consider stable models corresponding to as-
signments where ϕ is true, one adds to Pϕ a rule
← not pϕ
Further constraints on boolean (sub)expressions can
be encoded similarly. In order to ensure that a given
(sub)expression ψ is true (respectively false), it is
enough to include to Pϕ the rules
← not pψ forces ψ to be true
← pψ forces ψ to be false
where pψ is the new atom corresponding to ψ. Notice
that our translation can be seen as first breaking the
boolean expression to a set of equivalences where new
atoms are defined for each expression and then mapping
these equivalence to rules.
Example 4 Consider an expression ϕ
(a ∨ ¬b) ∧ (¬a⊕ b)
It can be seen as a set of equivalences
{p1 ⇔ p2 ∧ p3, p2 ⇔ a ∨ ¬b, p3 ⇔ (¬a⊕ b)}.
Now the program Pϕ is
p1 ← p2, p3
p2 ← a
p2 ← not b
p3 ← not a, not b
p3 ← a, b
a← not aˆ
aˆ← not a
b← not bˆ
bˆ← not b
For instance, the stable model {a, bˆ, p2} of Pϕ corre-
sponds to the truth assignment where the atom a is true
but b is false. If we want to have only models where ϕ
true, it is enough to add to Pϕ the rule
← not p1 .
When this is done, the resulting program has two stable
models: {a, b, p1, p2, p3} and {aˆ, bˆ, p1, p2, p3}.
A boolean function given as a truth table can be repre-
sented using rules by considering a disjunctive normal
form representation of the function. This means that
we give the conditions under which the function obtains
the value true and provide for each such case a corre-
sponding rule.
Example 5 The function f given by the table on the
left hand side can be encoded by the rules on its right.
x1 x2 x3 f
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
f ← not x1, not x2, not x3
f ← not x1, x2, not x3
f ← x1, x2, not x3
The US Data Encryption Standard
For a complete description of DES see (FIPS 1997),
(Schneier 1994, Chap.12), or (Stinson 1998). DES is a
block-cipher and its input is a 64 bit block of plaintext
and a 64 bit key, where every eighth bit is a parity check
bit that is stripped off before the encryption. So, the
actual key-size of DES is 56 bits. This key is used for
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Figure 1: The structure of DES
generating the round-keys, 48 bit permuted subkeys of
the key. The output is a 64 bit block of ciphertext.
The high level structure of DES is presented in Fig-
ure 1(a). Following Figure 1(a) top-down we see that
DES starts with an initial permutation IP of the 64 bit
block of plaintext followed by a structure that is called
a Feistel cipher (Feistel, Notz, & Smith 1975).
The basic component of a Feistel cipher is called a
round and is constituted by the following operations:
1. the input of 64 bits is divided into left and right parts;
2. the right half (32 bits), together with a round-key, is
taken as input of a function f (the round function),
which is described below;
3. the output of f is XORed with the left half and the
result is a new right half;
4. the unaltered old right half becomes the new left half.
These rounds can now be chained together and the com-
plete DES contains 16 rounds (Figure 1(a) illustrates
three rounds). The strength of DES depends on the
number of rounds: after 8 rounds a change in an in-
put bit affects all output bits. In the end of DES, the
switching of left and right sides is omitted and the bits
are again permuted using the inversion of the initial
permutation.
DES function f . Inside the function f (see Figure
1(b)) the 32 input bits are first expanded to 48 bits by
duplicating some of them. The expanded bit string is
XORed with the round-key given by the keyschedule
described below. The resulting bits are input to 8 S-
boxes, 6 bits for each box. The S-boxes are functions of
six (binary) variables. The output of every S-box con-
sists of 4 bits. The resulting 32 bits are finally permuted
according to permutation P. The content of the boxes
was decided at the time DES was developed and they
are the only non-linear part of DES, hence the security
of DES relies on them.
Keyschedule. The keyschedule function takes as in-
put the key and provides as out a 48 bit round-key for
each round of the Feistel cipher. The DES key is a vec-
tor of 64 bits, where every 8th bit is a parity bit. First
the parity bits are stripped off, then the keybits are per-
muted according to the permutation PC-1. The result
is divided into two parts that are shifted to the left one
or two positions recursively, see Figure 1(c). After each
shift the bit string is again permuted (PC-2) in order
to produce the round-key.
A Direct Encoding of DES
We develop first a direct encoding of DES as a logic
program. It does not contain any optimization and the
idea is to keep the code simple and readable. The code
can be used for encryption or key search3 with several
3We have been successful only for limited versions of DES
where the number of rounds is less than 16 (the full version).
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (the known plaintext attack).
The encoding is given as rules with variables. How-
ever, each variable has a domain predicate in the body
of the rule so that a set of ground instances with ex-
actly the same stable models is straightforward to de-
termine. The predicates contain variables P indicating
a plaintext-ciphertext pair and N for round. The corre-
sponding domain predicates are round(N) and pair(P )
which specify the relevant rounds and pairs, respec-
tively. The total number of rounds is denoted by a
constant r. For instance, if we are considering a three
round version of DES with two plaintext-ciphertext
pairs, these domain predicates would be defined using
the facts:
round(0)
round(1)
round(2)
round(3)
pair(1)
pair(2)
We describe first DES as used for encryption and then
indicate changes needed to be done, e.g., for key search.
The plaintext is given as facts p(P,B), where B ∈ [1, 64]
gives the number of the bit and P indicates the pair in
question. Note that only facts for true plaintext bits
need to be written. For instance, a set of facts
{p(1, 1), p(1, 2), . . . , p(1, 16)}
specifies that in the first plaintext-ciphertext pair, the
plaintext bits 1, . . . , 16 are true and all other false.
Round Operations
The rules which encode the round operations, i.e., the
rules that join the previous round to the next, are sum-
marized in Figure 2. They work as follows.
For the first round, the 64-bit block of plaintext is
first permuted according to the initial-permutation IP
which is given as a set of facts
{ip(1, 40), . . . , ip(9, 39)}
Using these facts the rule for permuted plaintext (r.1)
is easy to express.
For each pair P , the bits are divided in two 32 bit
parts and renumbered. The renumbering is used only
to make the description of the function f easier to write
and understand and it is done by dividing both halves
(32 bits) into 8 groups with each 4 bits. The bits are
numbered so that the first digit represents the group
and the second digit represents the bit. For example,
bit 32, is the second bit in the third group. This renum-
bering is given as facts:
renumber left(1, 11)
renumber left(2, 12)
renumber left(3, 13)
renumber left(4, 14)
renumber left(5, 21)
. . .
renumber left(32, 84)
renumber right(33, 11)
renumber right(34, 12)
renumber right(35, 13)
renumber right(36, 14)
renumber right(37, 21)
. . .
renumber right(64, 84)
These facts are used in the rules r.2 and r.3 specifying
the right and left parts where the predicate bit(B) is de-
fined using a set of facts giving the possible renumbered
bits 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, . . . , 84.
(r.1) permuted plaintext(P,B1)← ip(B,B1), p(P,B), pair(P )
(r.2) r(P, IB, 0)← permuted plaintext(P,B1), renumber right(B1, IB), pair(P ), bit(B)
(r.3) l(P, IB, 0)← permuted plaintext(P,B1), renumber left(B1, IB), pair(P ), bit(B)
(r.4) l(P,B,N + 1)← r(P,B,N), N + 1 < r, bit(B), pair(P ), round(N), round(N + 1)
(r.5) r(P,B,N + 1)← l(P,B,N), not f(P,B,N + 1), N + 1 < r, bit(B), pair(P ), round(N), round(N + 1)
(r.6) r(P,B,N + 1)← not l(P,B,N), f(P,B,N + 1), N + 1 < r, bit(B), pair(P ), round(N), round(N + 1)
(r.7) r(P,B, r) ← r(P,B, r − 1), bit(B), pair(P )
(r.8) l(P,B, r)← l(P,B, r − 1), not f(P,B, r), bit(B), pair(P )
(r.9) l(P,B, r)← not l(P,B, r − 1), f(P,B, r), bit(B), pair(P )
(r.10) unpermuted cipher(P,B1)← r(P, IB, r), renumber right(B1, IB), pair(P )
(r.11) unpermuted cipher(P,B1)← l(P, IB, r), renumber left(B1, IB), pair(P )
(r.12) cipher(P,BC)← ip(BC,B1), unpermuted cipher(P,B1), pair(P )
Figure 2: Round operations
For each round N + 1 and each plaintext-ciphertext
pair P , the left and right parts l(P,B,N + 1) and
r(P,B,N + 1) can be defined in terms of the previ-
ous parts and the result of the function f as follows.
The right side is swapped to the left (r.4) and the left
side is XORed with the output of f to form the right
side for the next round (r.5–r.6).
In the final round the switching of left and right
halves is omitted (r.7–r.9) but the renumbering is un-
done and the final permutation (r.10–r.12) is applied.
Function f
For each round N and for each pair P , the function
f takes as input the 32 bits of the right part of the
previous round r(P,B,N − 1) and a 48 bit round-key
k(B,N) and works as follows. First every group of the
right part is expanded from 4 to 6 bits. For example,
the rule
e(P, 65, N)← r(P, 64, N − 1), round(N),
round(N − 1), pair(P ) (4)
means that the 4th bit in the 6th group becomes the
5th bit in the 6th group. The expanded bit string is
XORed with the key bits:
a(P,B,N)← e(P,B,N), not k(B,N),
round(N), N 6= 0, pair(P ), ebit(B)
a(P,B,N)← not e(P,B,N), k(B,N),
round(N), N 6= 0, pair(P ), ebit(B)
where the predicate ebit(B) is defined using a set
of facts giving the possible extended renumbered bits
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, . . . , 86.
The resulting groups of 6 bits are the input of their
respective S-boxes. The output of every S-box consists
of 4 bits. If we consider the output one bit at the time,
the S-boxes can be seen as truth tables. For example, if
the input to the second S-box is 010101, it’s output is
0001. We can encode this behavior with the following
rule:
b(P, 24, N)← not a(P, 21, N), a(P, 22, N),
not a(P, 23, N), a(P, 24, N),
not a(P, 25, N), a(P, 26, N),
round(N), N 6= 0, pair(P ).
Once again, with the stable models semantics only rules
that imply true output bits are needed (see, Exam-
ple 5). In this case, the output bits 1-3 are zeros, there-
fore no rules are needed for them. In the end of the
DES function, the vector of bits is permuted according
to the permutation P. The rules for permutation are
similar to the ones in expansion.
For each round N , the keyschedule is given as a set
of rules using the key bit facts key(K). For example,
the rule
k(11, 1)← key(10), round(1)
specifies that in the first round the (renumbered) bit 11
of the round-key is determined by the key bit 10. The
stages presented in Figure 1(c) and the renumbering is
calculated beforehand in order to avoid some modulo
arithmetic. This can be done because the keyschedule
is independent of the plaintext to be used.
Encryption and key search
The encoding can be easily modified to solve many
kinds of computational problems related to DES by
changing the way the plaintext, ciphertext and the key
are encoded.
Encryption: It is sufficient to give the true bits B of
the plaintext as facts p(P,B) for each pair P and the
true bits of the key as facts key(K). Now for each pair
P , the true bits of the encrypted ciphertext can be
recovered as ground facts cipher(P,B) in the unique
stable model of the encoding with the plaintext and
key facts.
Decryption: The true bits of the key are specified as
facts key(K), the ciphertext is given in the form
← cipher(P,B) for 0-bits
← not cipher(P,B) for 1-bits
and the plaintext by the rules of the form (3) saying
that one can choose the truth values of the ground
atoms p(P,B). Then the decrypted plaintext is given
by the stable model of the encoding: for each true bit
of the plaintext a ground fact p(P,B) is in the model.
Actually, DES is symmetric. This means that de-
cryption is usually done the same way as encryption,
using the key schedule in reverse order and the ci-
phertext in place of the plaintext.
Known plaintext attack: For this attack we assume
that a certain number of pairs of plaintexts and the
corresponding ciphertexts are available and that we
want to recover the key. For each pair P , the true
bits B of the plaintext are given as facts p(P,B), the
ciphertext is given in the form
← cipher(P,B) for 0-bits
← not cipher(P,B) for 1-bits
and the key is given by rules of the form (3)
key(k)← not k̂ey(k)
k̂ey(k)← not key(k)
specifying that the truth values of the ground atoms
key(k) corresponding to the key bits can be chosen.
Then the stable models of the resulting encoding cor-
respond to the possible keys yielding the ciphertext
from the plaintext for each pair P . A key is given
as ground facts key(K) in the corresponding stable
model for all true key bits.
An Optimized Encoding of DES
Massacci and Marraro (Massacci & Marraro 2000) have
devised an optimized encoding of DES to SAT which is
particularly effective when the plaintext and the cipher-
text are used in a known plaintext attack. We show
how to modify this to work with logic programs. We
sketch here just the main ideas to make the paper self-
contained and refer to (Massacci & Marraro 2000) for
further details on the encoding.
The basic idea of the direct encoding is to represent
each step of DES as a logic program, the more straight-
forward, the better. For the optimized encoding we
start from a different direction and represent DES as a
logical circuit in which each operation is represented as
a boolean formula.
Then, for the operations that are repeated at each
round (such as the round function f) we apply off-
line some advanced CAD minimization techniques to
squeeze their size as much as possible. In particular in
(Massacci & Marraro 2000) the CAD program Espresso
(Rudell & Sangiovanni-Vincentelli 1987) has been used
for minimizing the representation of S-Boxes as Pro-
grammable Logic Arrays (PLAs). The PLA represen-
tation is just a representation of boolean functions with
disjunctions of conjunctions.
This yields a notable squeeze in the size of the
boolean formulae representing the corresponding oper-
ations of the S-Boxes but is not enough. The second
important twist is that whenever possible, the program
“executes” directly the DES operations on the propo-
sitional variables representing the input bits. For in-
stance, a permutation is not encoded into a boolean
formula, rather the program executes the permutation
of the input bits and provides as output the permuted
propositional variables.
The simplifying effect of this operation can be also
explained as a form of partial evaluation in the di-
rect encoding of DES. Consider, for instance, the logic
program rule (4). The net effect of the “execution”
step is that e(P, 65, N + 1) is replaced everywhere by
r(P, 64, N).
At the end of this process the encoder program
def2fml used in (Massacci & Marraro 2000) could out-
put a minimized logic program corresponding to DES
w.r.t. the direct encoding that we have described in the
previous section using the rules we have given in the
section on coding boolean formulae.
We can do more when the plaintext and the cipher-
text are known, i.e. when we want to perform a known
plaintext attack. In particular, with a boolean repre-
sentation we can perform a notable amount of linear
reasoning (reasoning using formulae with exclusive or).
In (Massacci 1999) it is noted that the presence of ex-
clusive or is what makes the problem hard for state-of-
the-art SAT checkers and therefore its minimization is
essential.
So, for the encoding we acquire the boolean values
corresponding to plaintext and ciphertext and prepro-
cess the formula by applying exhaustively a set of sim-
plification rules aimed at eliminating redundancies:
1. Variables defined by atomic equivalences4 are re-
placed by the corresponding values to reduce the
number of variables in other formulae, and to intro-
duce the truth values.
2. The propositional simplification rules listed in Fig-
ure 3 are applied.
The second step (propositional simplification) may in-
troduce additional atomic equivalences and therefore
the overall simplification phase is repeated until satu-
ration is reached.
Notice that such preprocessing, and in particular the
operations involving exclusive or, cannot be performed
with a logic program representation (at least with cur-
rent technology).
The resulting formula is then translated into a logic
program using a further optimized translation w.r.t.
that presented in the section on boolean encoding. We
can exploit the knowledge that the final formula we got
has the form shown in Figure 4 (adapted from (Mas-
sacci & Marraro 2000)) and translate it as shown in
Figure 5. The variables P and N stand for the number
of pair and rounds, according the format of the direct
encoding. The letter b corresponds to a suitable ground
value of the bit number represented by the variable B
used in the direct encoding. Notice that the final out-
put is a ground logic program so that N and P are
appropriately instantiated by the optimizing encoder.
Notice that the translation of the formula is done
piecewise: each equivalence is translated in a suitable
4We define an atomic equivalence as a formula of the
form V ⇔ F where V is a variable and F is either another
variable or a truth value.
r(P, b, 3)← ±s(P, b′, 1), not s(P, b′′, 3)
r(P, b, 3)← not ± s(P, b′, 1), s(P, b′′, 3)
r(P, b, 4)← ±s(P, b′, 2), not s(P, b′′, 4)
r(P, b, 4)← ±not s(P, b′, 2), s(P, b′′, 4)
r(P, b,N)← r(P, b′, N − 2), not s(P, b′′, N), 5 ≤ N ≤ r − 4
r(P, b,N)← not r(P, b′, N − 2), s(P, b′′, N), 5 ≤ N ≤ r − 4
s(P, b,N)← m(P, b′, N), 1 ≤ N ≤ r and 1 ≤ b′ ≤ nN
s(P, b, r − 1)← ±r(P, b′, r − 5), not s(P, b′′, r − 3)
s(P, b, r − 1)← not ± r(P, b′, r − 5), s(P, b′′, r − 3)
s(P, b, r)← ±r(P, b′, r − 4), not s(P, b′′, r − 2)
s(P, b, r)← not ± r(P, b′′, r − 4), s(P, b′′, r − 2)
m(P, b, 1)← ±k(b′, 1), . . .± k(b′′, 1)
m(P, b,N)← x(P, b′, N)1, . . . , x(P, b
′′, N)nN , 2 ≤ N ≤ r − 1
m(P, b, r)← ±k(b′, r), . . .± k(b′′, r)
x(P, b, 2)← ±s(P, b′, 1), not k(b′′, 2)
x(P, b, 2)← ±not s(P, b′, 1), k(b′′, 2)
x(P, b, 3)← ±s(P, b′, 2), not k(b′′, 3)
x(P, b, 3)← ±not s(P, b′, 2), k(b′′, 3)
x(P, b,N)← r(P, b′, N − 1), not k(b′′, N), 4 ≤ N ≤ r − 3
x(P, b,N)← not r(P, b′, N − 1), k(b′′, N), 4 ≤ N ≤ r − 3
x(P, b, r − 2)← ±s(P, b′, r − 1), not k(b′′, r − 1)
x(P, b, r − 2)← ±not s(P, b′, r − 1), k(b′′, r − 1)
x(P, b, r − 1)← ±s(P, b′, r), not k(b′′, r)
x(P, b, r − 1)← ±not s(P, b′, r), k(b′′, r)
Figure 5: Optimized logic program for DES with r rounds
Formula Simplification
A⇔ X ∧X A⇔ X
A⇔ X ∧ 0 A⇔ 0
A⇔ X ∧ 1 A⇔ X
A⇔ X ∧X A⇔ 0
A⇔ X ∨X A⇔ X
A⇔ X ∨ 0 A⇔ X
A⇔ X ∨ 1 A⇔ 1
A⇔ X ∨X A⇔ 1
A⇔ X ⊕X A⇔ 0
A⇔ X ⊕X A⇔ 1
A⇔ X ⊕ 0 A⇔ X
A⇔ X ⊕ 1 A⇔ X
Formula Generated Equivalence
1⇔ A ∧B A⇔ 1; B ⇔ 1
0⇔ A ∨B A⇔ 0; B ⇔ 0
0⇔ A⊕B A⇔ B
1⇔ A⊕B A⇔ B
A⇔ A⊕B B ⇔ 0
A⇔ A⊕B B ⇔ 1
Figure 3: Simplification rules
number of rules: we use one rule for conjunctions, two
rules for XORs, and many rules of disjunctions (as many
as there are disjuncts). The trick is that we only en-
code one direction of the the equivalence exploiting the
property of logic programs that “everything is false by
default”. In this way we have only to specify when a
boolean formula may be true.
However, this is still not sufficient because the trans-
lation as sketched is not faithful: we might have more
than one “definition” of the same atom, i.e. one or more
formulae of the form A⇔ φ1 for the same atom A.
If we left it that way, there would not be a one-
one correspondence between stable models and proposi-
tional truth assignments. We would have more models
than due. So we need a further twist to cope with atoms
r(P, b, 3)⇔ ±s(P, b′′, 1)⊕ s(P, b′′, 3)
r(P, b, 4)⇔ ±s(P, b′, 2)⊕ s(P, b′′, 4)
r(P, b,N)⇔ r(P, b′, N−2)⊕ s(P, b′′, N), 5 ≤N≤ r − 4
s(P, b,N)⇔
∨
b′ m(P, b
′, N), N = 1 . . . r
±s(P, b, r − 1)⇔ r(P, b′, r − 5)⊕ s(P, b′′, r − 3)
±s(P, b, r)⇔ r(P, b′, r − 4)⊕ s(P, b′′, r − 2)
m(P, b, 1)⇔
∧
b′ ±k(b
′, 1)
m(P, b,N)⇔
∧
b′ x(P, b
′, N), 2 ≤ N ≤ r − 1
m(P, b, r)⇔
∧
b′ ±k(b
′, r)
x(P, b, 2)⇔ ±s(P, b′, 1)⊕ k(b′′, 2)
x(P, b, 3)⇔ ±s(P, b′, 2)⊕ k(b′′, 3)
x(P, b,N)⇔ r(P, b′, i− 1)⊕ k(b′′, N), 4 ≤ N ≤ r − 3
x(P, b, r − 2)⇔ ±s(P, b′, r − 1)⊕ k(b′′, r − 1)
x(P, b, r − 1)⇔ ±s(b′, r) ⊕ k(b′′, r)
Figure 4: Simplified DES formulae for r rounds with
known plaintext and ciphertext
that are defined (are on the left of the equivalence sign
in Figure 4) two or more times. Suppose that we have
a set of formulae of the form:
a⇔ ϕ1, . . . , a⇔ ϕn.
and that Pa⇔ϕi denotes the fragment of the logic pro-
gram translating the boolean formula a⇔ ϕi according
the rules we have used in Table 1 and Figure 5.
We translate this set of formulae as follows:
Boolean formula Logic program
a⇔ ϕ1 Pa⇔ϕ1
a⇔ ϕ2 a← a2
← a, not a2
Pa2⇔ϕ2
...
...
a⇔ ϕn a← an
← a, not an
Pan⇔ϕn
One may check that this is a faithful translation of the
corresponding boolean formulae. The intuitive expla-
nation is simply that the boolean set of formulae, read
conjunctively, just says that all ϕi must have the same
value and this value must also be assigned to a. The
first rule chooses a value, say ϕ1 and assign it to a as
in the standard encoding. The rest of the construction
assigns the value of ϕi to a new atom ai and then spec-
ifies that a is true when ai is true and that ai cannot
be false when a is true.
Then we add the rules (3) saying that one can choose
the truth values of the atoms corresponding to key bits,
as we do for the direct encoding, and we are done.
Experiments
We study the computational properties of the two logic
program encodings of DES by using them for key search
in a known plaintext attack for a limited form of DES
running a given number of rounds. For each num-
ber of rounds and pairs of plaintext-ciphertext blocks
we perform 50 key searches using different randomly
generated plaintexts and report the mean of the run-
ning time and of the size of the search tree. The tests
were run under Linux 2.2.12 on 450 MHz Pentium III
computers. The encodings and test cases are avail-
able at http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels/
tests/des.html.
Table 2 reports the data on Smodels’s performance.
The running times do not include preprocessing. For
the direct encoding (Dir.) preprocessing consists of
parsing and grounding of the rules which is done by
the standard Smodels parser lparse. This takes only
few seconds even for the largest examples. For the op-
timized encoding (Opt.) preprocessing is more involved
as explained in the previous section. It includes off-
line minimization of boolean functions used in DES,
partial evaluating the DES description, simplifying it
using the known plaintexts-ciphertext pairs, transform-
ing the resulting boolean formula to a set of ground
logic program rules as well as parsing the rules into the
internal format of smodels. Hence, in both cases pre-
processing produces a ground program parsed into the
internal format of smodels. Table 2 gives the average
running time and search space size for smodels (version
2.25 with -backjump option) to find a stable model (a
key) for such a ground program. Entries marked with
’—’ are cases where the set of 50 key searches could not
be completed because the running time for each key
search extended several CPU hours.
Both encodings have a reasonable performance (al-
though it should be noted that special purpose meth-
ods and hardware are able to perform known plaintext
attacks successfully even to the full DES). The direct
encoding does not seem to be able to propagate the in-
formation from the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs as
efficiently as the preprocessing techniques in the op-
timized encoding. The search heuristics of smodels
yields a rather stable performance on these DES ex-
amples except for the optimized encoding with three
rounds and two blocks where there are three orders of
Table 2: Smodels on DES
Smodels
Rounds Blocks Time (s) Branches
(Dir.) (Opt.) (Dir.) (Opt.)
1 1 0.3 0.07 155 28
1 2 1.6 0.06 372 18
1 4 2.2 0.1 179 16
1 8 5.8 0.2 200 16
2 1 1.2 0.1 151 9
2 2 1.7 0.1 98 8
2 4 2.0 0.2 51 8
2 8 3.6 0.4 39 8
3 1 — 230 — 699
3 2 640 8900 20672 6000
3 4 1400 190 14709 29
3 8 3500 48 18612 8
Table 3: rel sat on DES
rel sat with learning factor 5
Rounds Blocks Time (s) Branches
1 1 0.02 32
1 2 0.1 100
1 4 0.2 107
1 8 0.4 87
2 1 0.2 283
2 2 0.2 106
2 4 0.3 70
2 8 0.7 56
3 1 — —
3 2 920 141291
3 4 110 14419
3 8 100 5483
magnitude differences in the minimal and maximal ob-
served running times and search space sizes.
We compare the performance of Smodels to that of
a SAT-checker which has been customized and tuned
for the optimized SAT-encoding of DES described in
(Massacci 1999; Massacci & Marraro 2000). This SAT-
checker, based on rel sat by Bayardo and Schrag (1997),
clearly outperforms state-of-the-art SAT-checkers on
DES encodings (Massacci & Marraro 2000).
Table 3 reports the data on rel sat. The data does
not include preprocessing which in this case is similar
to that of the optimized logic program encoding with
the addition that it includes also the transformation of
the optimized DES description (a boolean formula) to
a compact conjunctive normal form (CNF) represen-
tation. Table 3 presents the average running time and
search space size for rel sat to find a propositional model
(a key) for this CNF formula.
From this preliminary analysis one can say that the
usage of stable models as computational paradigm to
be used in practice does not score at all badly for such
an industrial application.
Conclusions
We believe that DES provides an interesting benchmark
problem for nonmonotonic reasoning systems because
(i) it supplies practically inexhaustible number of indus-
trial relevant test cases, (ii) the encoding of DES using
normal logic programs with the stable model semantics
is easy to understand, and (iii) test cases are obtained
for many nonmonotonic formalisms which contain this
subclass of logic programs as a special case. We have
developed a direct encoding and an optimized one ex-
tending the work of Massacci and Marraro. We have
also tested the computational performance of the en-
codings using the Smodels system.
As DES is basically a boolean function, its encod-
ing does not require any particular nonmonotonic con-
structs. In our encoding we have used default nega-
tion in a straightforward way (everything is false unless
otherwise stated), to obtain a much leaner encoding
than those obtained by encoding DES as a SAT formula
(where both ways of the equivalence are needed). The
resulting encodings are acyclic sets of rules which are
compact but fairly simple to write and understand. It
seems that they are more easier to understand than cor-
responding encodings of DES using CNF clauses which
is the typical input format for current state-of-the-art
SAT-checkers. Given that DES key search is a natural
boolean satisfiability problem, it is somewhat surpris-
ing that our encodings are competitive when compared
to state-of-the-art SAT-checkers and even to a tuned
and customized SAT-checker working on an optimized
SAT-encoding of DES. We think that the success can
be accounted for by the compactness of the logic pro-
gram encoding and the search methods and pruning
techniques employed in the Smodels system.
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the rela-
tive strengths of SAT-checkers and stable model imple-
mentations, an interesting comparison would be to map
the stable model finding problem of DES key search di-
rectly to a satisfiability problem and use a state-of-the-
art SAT-checker to solve the resulting problem. As our
encodings are acyclic programs, the reduction could be
done using, e.g., a completion approach (Fages 1994).
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